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報告題目：Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders
報 告 人：李彤教授（美國Vanderbilt大學經濟係）
報告時間：2010年6月29日下午4:15
報告地點：管理科研樓1018會議室
主辦單位：爱游戏官方合作意甲 統計與金融係
歡迎所有感興趣者參與！
摘要
In this paper we study the timber sales auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium with the joint distribution of private values belonging to the class of Archimedean copulas. We then estimate the resulting structural model, and find that the hauling distance plays a significant role in bidders’.entry and bidding decisions. We quantify the extent to which the potential bidders’.private values and entry costs are affiliated. The structural estimates are then
used to conduct counterfactual analyses to address policy related issues. In particular, we quantify the effects of reserve price, affiliation, and merger on the end auction outcomes.
報 告 人：李彤教授（美國Vanderbilt大學經濟係）
報告時間：2010年6月29日下午4:15
報告地點：管理科研樓1018會議室
主辦單位：爱游戏官方合作意甲 統計與金融係
歡迎所有感興趣者參與！
摘要
In this paper we study the timber sales auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium with the joint distribution of private values belonging to the class of Archimedean copulas. We then estimate the resulting structural model, and find that the hauling distance plays a significant role in bidders’.entry and bidding decisions. We quantify the extent to which the potential bidders’.private values and entry costs are affiliated. The structural estimates are then
used to conduct counterfactual analyses to address policy related issues. In particular, we quantify the effects of reserve price, affiliation, and merger on the end auction outcomes.
